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Abstract 
 Prejudice against women is often stated as a reason why women do not achieve the 
same success as men in the workplace. Previous research has suggested that this 
discrimination may in part be due to a pro-male evaluation bias. Evaluations of others are not 
only affected by their gender, but also by traits belonging to the evaluator. Respondents often 
assume that their own traits and preferences will be more common in a population than what 
is actually the case. This bias is called the false consensus effect. The present study combines 
the externally triggered pro-male bias with the internally triggered false consensus effect to 
investigate the evaluation of a fictive stimulus person. The Cognitive Style Index was 
completed by 186 employees, 65 women and 121 men, at the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence. The respondents were asked to judge the perceived rationality of a fictive stimulus 
decision made in the workplace. In half of the administered questionnaires the stimulus 
person bore a female name, in the other half the stimulus person was male. In the present 
study, no pro-male bias was found. The respondents judged the cognitive style of the stimulus 
person to be similar to their own cognitive style, suggesting a false consensus effect. Earlier 
studies have found men to be more prone to the use of heuristics. In the present study the false 
consensus effect was found for the female respondents in the sample only. This surprising 
result is discussed against the backdrop of motivational explanations of the false consensus 
effect. 
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Introduction 
 People like to think that their evaluations of others are rational and objective, based on 
the available information. This is not always the case (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). When making 
evaluations people often rely on biases and heuristics. Biases and heuristics can also be 
described as rules of thumb, or mental shortcuts. Biases and heuristics lead people to 
disregard some of the available information, and substitute information that is not relevant to 
the evaluation in question (Stanovich, 1996). Biases and heuristics are often useful and 
adaptive mechanisms. They allow us to make quicker judgements and evaluations that usually 
are accurate enough for their use (Plous, 1993). When judging colleagues in an occupational 
setting, however, these heuristics and biases might lead selection personnel and other 
employees to systematically judge certain individuals or subgroups in an unfair manner. In a 
modern Western work environment that strives to provide equal career opportunities, it is of 
interest to examine to which extent the evaluations that are made are fair, or whether biases 
cause systematical disadvantages for certain groups of employees (Heilman, 2001). 
 One of the common biases in evaluations is the pro-male evaluation bias. This bias 
leads respondents to judge the performance of a male stimulus person more favourably than 
the identical performance of a female stimulus person (Goldberg, 1968). Respondents have 
been shown to evaluate male stimulus persons as more competent, professional and rational 
than women (e.g. Goldberg, 1968; Paludi & Bauer, 1983; Taynor & Deaux, 1975). In similar 
studies, the performances of men were more generously rewarded than the performances of 
women (Feather, 1975; Feather & Simon, 1975). When women succeed, their success is to a 
greater degree attributed to luck and not to skills (Ethaugh & Brown, 1975). Studies have also 
shown that women were evaluated as less rational than men (Taynor & Deaux, 1975). This 
bias seems to be present in both men and women, but in most cases men display a stronger 
pro-male bias than women (Paludi & Bauer, 1983). 
 The pro-male bias is an externally triggered bias, as it is triggered by characteristics 
belonging to the stimulus person. In the case of the pro-male bias, heuristic cognitive 
processes cause the gender of the stimulus person to distort evaluations. However, evaluations 
are not only distorted by externally triggered heuristics. Some biases are also internally 
triggered, irrelevant of actual characteristics in the stimulus person. The false consensus effect 
is one such internally triggered bias. The false consensus effect, or consensus bias, is a bias 
that leads people to assume that an artificially high percentage of the population shares their 
views and traits (Ross, Greene & House, 1976). When people‟s judgements are affected by 
the false consensus bias they overestimate the commonness of their own preferences, 
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behaviours, attributes, values and opinions in a population (Mullen et al., 1985). When 
evaluating another person, people assume that this other person will share their views and 
preferences, and this assumption distorts the evaluation.  
 The bulk of the research on the pro-male bias dates back to before the 1990‟s. In our 
modern society we strive to achieve equal work opportunities for men and women and pride 
ourselves that prejudice is decreasing. It is therefore of interest to examine whether these 
gender stereotypes still exist, several years after most of the research on the pro-male bias was 
conducted.  
 To my knowledge, no research has been done on whether the gender of the respondent 
affects the strength of the false consensus effect, as there is no tradition for systematically 
including gender as a moderator in studies of the false consensus effect. However, men have 
been shown to make more frequent use of heuristic thinking than women (Benyamini, 
Leventhal & Leventhal, 2000; Gilligan, 1982; Lenney, Gold & Browning, 1983; Poole, 1977). 
These findings lend support to the theory of the selectivity model, as the selectivity model 
states that men are more prone than women to focus on the big picture and employ heuristic 
thinking in decision making (Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991; 
Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1991). As the false consensus effect is a form of heuristic thinking, 
and gender influences the strength of heuristic thinking, the present study investigated 
whether the gender of the respondents affected the strength of the false consensus effect as 
well. 
 In the present study I therefore assumed that the respondents would display a pro-male 
bias and a false consensus effect in their evaluations. I also assumed that these two effects 
would be moderated by the gender of the respondent, and that the effects would be stronger 
for the men in the sample. The present study approximately replicates designs used in the 
research done on the pro-male bias in the 70s and 80s (e.g. Taynor & Deaux, 1975). The 
respondents were presented with a stimulus scenario and asked to evaluate the perceived 
rationality of the described stimulus person. In half of the stimulus scenarios the stimulus 
person bore a female name, the other half of the respondents were presented with a male 
stimulus person. Apart from the difference in the gender of the stimulus persons, the stimulus 
scenarios were identical. I also investigated the respondent‟s own preference for rationality in 
decision making, in order to test for a false consensus effect for preference of rationality.  
 Based on the investigated prior research, the present study sought to make three main 
contributions to this field of research. One was to investigate whether the pro-male bias still 
existed in today‟s work life. The second was to investigate whether the gender of the 
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respondent would affect the strength of the false consensus effect, as this to my knowledge 
has not been examined in earlier research. Thirdly, I set out to investigate how the externally 
triggered pro-male bias and the internally triggered false consensus effect together explained 
the respondent‟s evaluation of a stimulus person. This would provide a unique opportunity to 
investigate how these biases of different origin and nature interact in affecting the 
respondents‟ evaluation of the stimulus person. This study thus combines two well 
documented concepts that have been shown to affect evaluations that have been extensively 
researched separately. These two biases belong to two different traditions within the 
psychology of judgement and decision making. It is however of interest to see how they may 
explain different aspects of the same evaluation. The present study has therefore examined the 
following model (see Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1 
Model investigated in the present study 
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Pro-male bias and false consensus bias in evaluations of others 
Pro-male evaluation bias  
 Even though most actors in the Western labour market strive to provide equal career 
opportunities for everybody regardless of gender, there are fewer women than men in top 
leadership positions (Albrecht, Björklund & Vroman, 2003; Bagues & Esteve-Volart, 2010). 
A common paradigm in gender stereotype research suggests that one reason for this lies in an 
evaluation bias towards women. When respondents are presented with a fictive stimulus 
scenario or situation with either a male or female stimulus person, they display a pro-male 
bias in evaluation of the stimulus performance. Goldberg (1968) presented female participants 
in an experiment with one out of two booklets containing a set of articles. In half of the 
booklets the author bore a female name, and in the other half the author was presented with a 
male name. The female respondents evaluated the male authors as more professionally 
competent and as better writers, both for articles written within the domain of typically male 
and typically female professions.  
 Mischel‟s 1974 replication of the Goldberg experiment used a sample containing men 
as well as women. Men were found to display the same pro-male bias, but neither male nor 
female respondents displayed a pro-male bias when evaluating articles written on 
predominantly female professional areas. In a study by Kaschak (1978) the respondents 
evaluated a description of the teaching methods of fictive stimulus professors. A pro-male 
bias was found, both on predominantly male and female professional areas, in line with the 
original study by Goldberg (1968) and contradictory to the Mischel study (1974). 
 Similar experiments show that this bias holds true for the evaluation of other types of 
performance as well. Respondents judged an artist‟s painting more favourably if the artist was 
male (Pheterson, Kiesler & Goldberg, 1971). This bias extends to the attribution of causes for 
success and failures. Men‟s success and women‟s failures are attributed to stable factors like 
skill and ability, or lack thereof. Women‟s success and men‟s failures are to a larger extent 
attributed to more unstable factors, such as effort or luck (Ethaugh & Brown, 1975). Women 
also display a tendency to attribute their own successes externally, and their own failures 
internally to a greater degree than men (Feather, 1969). Ethaugh & Brown (1975) have 
suggested that this may be because the success of a woman in a predominantly male situation 
is an unexpected outcome. Unexpected outcomes are more often attributed to external causes, 
whereas anticipated outcomes more often are attributed to stable, internal causes (Weiner et 
al., 1971).  
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 There has been little evidence to support a corresponding pro-female evaluation bias 
when evaluating performances in predominantly female settings. Men are usually evaluated 
more favourably also in these cases, and their success is attributed to stable, internal causes 
(Deaux & Emswiller, 1974). Participants in experiments also tend to punish the failures of 
women stronger, and reward the success of men more (Feather, 1975; Feather & Simon, 
1975). This pro-male bias seems universal, but the strength of this bias is affected by several 
variables. 
 
 When is the pro-male bias stronger? Pro-male bias in the workplace and on work 
related tasks are especially prominent in work situations which evoke sex role stereotypes 
(Gutek & Stevens, 1977) and when candidates are being evaluated in typically male 
situations, professions and positions (Holter, 1971; Levinson, 1975). Some studies have 
shown a consistent bias for all types of positions, while other studies show a stereotype effect 
only for gender specific professions (Cohen & Bunker, 1975). People exhibit a stronger pro-
male evaluation bias in situations when the stimulus situation to be evaluated is future 
potential and qualifications, and when making causal attributions (Nieva & Gutek, 1980). 
Pro-male bias also appeared to increase in judgements that were based on ambiguous and 
diffuse performance criteria (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Rosen & Jerdee, 1974; Terborg & 
Ilgen, 1975).  
 Some studies have suggested that the pro-male bias is diminished or eliminated when 
the stimulus person has already been declared competent or better than the other candidates 
(Pheterson, Kiesler & Goldberg, 1971). Other studies have found that the declaration of 
competence in the stimulus person did not affect the pro-male bias (Deaux & Taynor, 1973; 
Kascak, 1978). A number of studies have indicated that the pro-male bias actually increases in 
strength when the candidates to be evaluated are high performers, high performers meaning 
candidates who perform above average in situations where much is demanded. Women are 
underestimated to a greater degree compared to equally competent men when the stimulus 
candidate performed a task exceedingly well, than when the stimulus candidates were low 
performers (Haefner, 1977). Pro-male bias also appears more resilient when evaluating 
candidates for or in a demanding position that requires managerial skills and decisive, 
aggressive behaviour (Rosen & Jerdee, 1974). This might help explain why women are 
scarcer in higher, managerial positions. The pro-male bias can be overcome when the women 
are forceful and aggressively assert their rights. Underpaid women that did not make strong 
demands were rewarded less than equally competent men. However, when they displayed 
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strong demands for pay increase, the women received larger pay increases than men 
(Freedman, 1997). 
 
 Contrasting findings. Some studies, however, have indicated a reverse effect of 
gender on competency ratings. Abramson et al. (1977) found that women performing well in 
male specific professions were viewed as more competent than males with the same 
performance in the same situation. Similarly, Taynor and Deaux (1973) found that women 
performing in masculine situations were perceived as being subjected to involuntary 
constraints and that the performance from a woman was more deserving of a reward than the 
same performance from a man. Jacobson and Effertz (1974) reported similar findings in 
leader performance evaluation. This pro-female bias is only present in situations when the 
stimulus person can be described as a high-performer, that is performs above the expected 
level (Bigoness, 1976).  
One way of explaining these results is that when the performed task is not typically 
female, the woman has had to work much harder than the man to achieve the same results. 
When the woman is subjected to a task that is not typically female, what is assumed by the 
respondents to be her natural preferences are perceived to act as involuntary constraints in the 
situation (Taynor & Deaux, 1973). Studies have shown that this explanation only holds true 
when the female stimulus person was temporarily out of role, and not when she was 
permanently and voluntarily acting out of gender role (Taynor & Deux, 1975). The other, 
perhaps less flattering, explanation has been dubbed „the walking dog phenomenon‟, or more 
recently, „the talking platypus phenomenon‟ (Abrahamson, Goldberg, Greenberg & 
Abrahamson, 1978). This theory suggests that we are so surprised to find a woman 
performing a male task at all, that we are less concerned about how well she performs it. 
Abrahamson et al. (1978) pointed out: when you find a talking platypus, it matters very little 
what the platypus says, or how well it says it. The true wonder is that the platypus is able to 
talk at all.  
This pro-female bias may further be explained in the light of equity theory (Heider, 
1958). When a woman is working under involuntary constraints and achieves the same as a 
man, her effort has to be greater than that of the man. When her effort is greater, she is more 
worthy of a reward. The contribution that qualifies the woman for a greater reward than the 
man is however only a result of a temporary effort, and not a result of stable internal traits 
(Deux & Emswiller, 1974). Thus, even in situations where we find a pro-female bias, this will 
not transfer onto expectations of keeping up the good performance in the future. While the 
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pro-male bias is an effect that affects evaluations over time and across situations, the pro-
female bias only arises under particular circumstances, and is only a temporary effect for the 
situation in question. 
 
 Occupational implications. Stereotypes affecting the evaluation of performance have 
also been found in the workplace and on work related tasks (Rosen et al., 1975). Such biases 
manifest in selection and hiring processes (e.g. Rosen & Jerdee, 1974; Shae, 1975). When 
women called to enquire about vacant male-dominated positions they were dismissed and 
rejected more often than when men made identical enquiries. These manifestations of gender 
bias concern both men and women applying for sex-inappropriate positions (Levinson, 1974). 
Both men and women prefer to work with male colleagues (Haefner, 1977) and are especially 
averse to co-operating with highly competent women (Hagen & Kahn, 1975). Studies have 
shown that respondents assumed that men would be happier about success and more upset 
about failure than their female co-workers in stereotypically male professions (Feather, 1975).  
 Such a gender bias in work settings may be part of the reason why women are not 
promoted to higher positions as often as men (Morrison, White & van Velsor, 1987). The pro-
male bias might be a contributing cause of women being discriminated against in personnel 
decisions involving hiring, promotion, development and supervision (Gutek & Stevens, 1977; 
Rosen & Jerdee, 1974). Experiments have shown that women were more seldom considered 
for positions that require late hours and a lot of travel than equally competent men, and that 
men were not expected to sacrifice their careers for family duties to the same degree as 
women (Rosen et al., 1975). A possible explanation for this discrimination of women in 
hiring and promoting situations might be that people responsible for hiring candidates are 
punished harder for hiring misfits than they are rewarded for hiring good candidates (Webster, 
1964). This might motivate them to focus on looking for possible negative traits in a 
candidate, and as being female is often considered a liability at work, women might suffer in 
the hiring process (Shaw, 1972).  
 In some studies women were hired just as often as men were, but not promoted to the 
same extent. A study by Cohen and Bunker (1975) found that women were discriminated 
against only on evaluations for managerial positions. Similar studies support these findings. 
Females are often hired at a lower level in the organization, but are not able to climb the 
corporate ladder through promotions to higher positions (Bigoness, 1976). This might be the 
result of women actually being less willing to sacrifice spare time and family life for a career. 
Another possible explanation is that the pro-male bias is stronger in situations with high 
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performers and highly competent candidates (Haefner, 1977). This might help explain why in 
some studies there was an equal gender distribution among the employees on the lower levels 
of management, but women were scarcer than men in upper level management positions. 
Cohen and Bunker (1975) report in a study that employees at the lower management level 
consisted of 51 % men and 49 % women. 61 % of the men were, however, employed in 
professional and managerial occupations, while only 32 % of the female white-collar workers 
were employed in similar positions. Competent women were evaluated as less desirable than 
men in a selection setting, and may not be able to advance to the same organizational level as 
their male colleagues whose performance is no better than theirs (Hagen & Kahn, 1975; 
Heilman, 2001).  
 The research rather solidly supports the existence of a pro-male bias on a multitude of 
different evaluation situations, including in occupational settings. The pro-male bias does not 
only exist on evaluations of competence, but on evaluations other traits as well. One of the 
areas where people have displayed a pro-male bias is in evaluations of rationality. A study by 
Taynor and Deaux (1975) showed that in a description of an emergency scenario, „Linda‟ was 
viewed as acting in a less logical manner than „Larry‟. Very few of the studies on the false 
consensus effect can however be called recent, and gender stereotypes might have diminished 
and the pro-male evaluation bias might have disappeared since the main body of this research 
was done. My first hypothesis is therefore as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The gender of the stimulus person affects the respondents‟ evaluations of  the 
 rationality of the actions of a stimulus person.  
 
 Replications of the original Goldberg study, and several other experiments, have 
shown that the gender of the respondent moderates the strength of the pro-male bias. 
Although a pro-male bias has been found in both men and women, male respondents have 
been found to display a stronger pro male-bias than women. Men have in example displayed a 
stronger pro-male bias in evaluations of the professional quality of written work (Paludi & 
Bauer, 1983) on competence in the work place (Hagen & Kahn, 1975), and on evaluations of 
rationality (Deaux & Taynor, 1975). My second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the gender of the stimulus person and respondents‟ 
 evaluations of the rationality of the actions in the stimulus scenario is moderated 
10 
 
 by the gender of the respondent. The male respondents show a stronger pro-male 
 bias than the female respondents. 
 
The false consensus bias 
 The research discussed so far has shown that the gender of the stimulus person 
affected the respondent‟s evaluation of a stimulus performance (e.g. Goldberg, 1968). But it is 
not only characteristics in the stimulus person that affects evaluations. The respondent‟s own 
traits, attitudes and opinions have also been shown to affect how respondents evaluate others. 
Respondents have a tendency to estimate their own beliefs and opinions to be more common 
than they are and to assume that a disproportionate part of the general population share their 
views and behaviour. This effect is often called the false consensus effect or consensus bias 
(e.g. Ross et al., 1976). This tendency to overestimate the prevalence of one‟s own 
preferences has been found in the evaluation of the opinions, preferences, attributes and 
behaviour of others (e.g., Brown, 1982; Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee, 1977; Goethals, 
Allison & Frost, 1979; Hansen & Donoghue, 1977;  Kulik & Taylor, 1980; Manstead, 1982; 
Nisbett & Kunda, 1985; van der Plight, 1984). The false consensus effect has been found in 
several mundane preferences. For example, people who preferred ham sandwiches to egg 
sandwiches assumed that most people would share their preference in this matter (Gilovich, 
Jenning & Jennings, 1983).  
 The false consensus effect has also been found in evaluations of political and religious 
views. Respondents have assumed others would agree with them in their opinions on 
women‟s liberations and rights (Sanders & Mullen, 1983) and on their frequency of attending 
religious services (Ross, Lepper, Strack & Steinmetz, 1977).  A study by Ross et al. (1976) 
indicates that this consensus bias also holds true for personal traits and attributes. Participants 
were asked to describe in what degree they saw themselves as possessing different traits, 
views, characteristics, preferences and habits. They were also asked to estimate the percentage 
of other college students that possessed the same qualities. The results from the Ross et al. 
study suggested that the respondents tended to see themselves in others, and to judge the traits 
and dispositions of others to be similar to their own traits and disposition.  
 A meta-analysis by Mullen et al. (1985) found support for the false consensus effect 
across 115 different studies. These studies have shown a false consensus effect in the 
evaluation of common day-to-day preferences, personality and cognitive traits, as well as 
fundamental values and philosophies of life. A false consensus bias has also been found in 
strategic preferences. Research has been done on interaction in situations similar to the 
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prisoner‟s dilemma (Selten & Ockenfels, 1996). These interaction situations have presented 
the respondents with a dilemma, where they have to choose whether to cooperate with other 
participants, or whether to prioritise to secure their own gain. Participants that were 
themselves willing to cooperate assumed that most other participants would also choose the 
cooperation strategy (Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee, 1977; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).  
 The false consensus effect is, however, relative and can be reduced and eliminated in 
the presence of certain moderation factors. Some studies have found that the false consensus 
effect nearly disappeared when the respondents were presented with statistical information or 
offered monetary incentives for accurate estimates (Engelmann & Strobel, 2001). In some 
cases the consensus of a sample group overrides the self-based consensus, especially in 
situations when the respondents are asked to estimate the commonness of behaviour, and not 
the commonness of attributions (Kulik & Taylor, 1979). The false consensus effect is also 
stronger when evaluating ambiguous traits that are not well defined and that can describe a 
number of different behaviours (Dunning et al., 1989). The false consensus effect is also 
weakened when the respondents hold extreme views and have very untraditional preferences. 
People who pursue extreme activities, such as mountain climbing, will be aware that this 
behaviour is due to a special preference of theirs, and not due to a general external factor that 
affects all people. There will still be a false consensus effect present, but this will be weaker 
than what is found for more mundane preferences (Ross et al., 1976).  
 
 Theoretical explanations for the false sense of consensus bias. The false consensus 
effect is often explained as either a cognitive heuristic bias, or as a motivational bias. 
According to the cognitive heuristics explanation the consensus bias is a result of the 
respondents relying too much on their own knowledge when estimating the prevalence of 
attributes or attitudes in a population (Krueger & Clement, 1994). When respondents envision 
how somebody will react in a hypothetical situation, or how someone will answer a 
hypothetical question, they inadvertently start by asking themselves how they would have 
reacted or answered.  This initial response to the situation and question acts as a cognitive 
anchor. A cognitive anchor is a cognitive bias that describes a tendency to rely too heavily, or 
„anchor‟ on one trait or piece of information when making decisions. In the case of the false 
consensus effect, the respondent‟s own preferences or response becomes an anchor that in 
turn affects their future estimates of the answers of others, as well as how they perceive 
other‟s actions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The respondents own preferences and traits is 
the first top-of-mind reaction to the stimulus question or scenario, and the primacy effect of 
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this initial thought affects later estimates of the commonness of the trait or preference to be 
judged in the population (Zajonc, 1980). This effect is further strengthened by the fact that 
people often choose to surround themselves with people who are like them and who agree 
with them. People are therefore selectively exposed to a population that shares their beliefs 
and attributes (Bersheid & Walsted, 1978). People are also prone to attribute their own actions 
to external factors that they cannot control, and not as much to personality traits, than what 
they do when evaluating the behaviour of others (Heider, 1958). This tendency can lead the 
respondents to assume that others will be under the influence of the same external factors as 
themselves, and therefore will act in the same way. These cognitive explanations of the false 
consensus effect explain the effect as a controlled, but biased, way of treating information 
(Krueger & Clement, 1994). In most cases this heuristic will allow respondents to quickly 
estimate the prevalence of a trait in a population with relative accuracy. Even though the bias 
is not statistically appropriate, it mimics normative inductive reasoning (Dawes, 1989). This 
heuristic often results in biased estimations, but is a sensible trade off when speed is more 
important than accuracy.  
 The other explanation of the false consensus bias is a motivational one. Respondents 
are motivated to assume that a population will be similar to themselves, and as a result feel 
that they are normal and fit in. Such a consensus bias will be functional for us, as it will boost 
our sense of social support, confirm our wish to perceive ourselves as normal, and maintain 
our self-esteem and cognitive balance (Marks & Miller, 1987). Heider (1958) has discussed 
the possibility that if we perceive our own reactions and judgements to be „logical‟ or as 
holding positive properties, this expectation of similarity between our own judgements and 
the judgements of others will be even stronger. The false consensus bias may thus be 
motivated by a whish to experience a sense of social support (Goetals et al., 1979; Sherman et 
al., 1983).  
 A meta-analysis by Mullen et al. (1984) found that the false consensus effect overall 
did not diminish when the respondents were presented with the actual consensus in the group 
or population. This seems to support the cognitive heuristics explanations more than the 
motivational explanation. The false consensus effect is closely related in nature to the base 
rate fallacy effect. The base rate fallacy is a tendency to ignore base rate information when 
making estimations of likelihood and probability of different outcomes (Nisbett, Borgida, 
Crandall & Reed, 1976). The base rate fallacy is generally viewed as a cognitive and 
perceptual phenomenon, and not as a motivational strategy in self-presentation, which lends 
support to the cognitive heuristics explanation. The false consensus effect is stronger for the 
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evaluation of very personal and important values. This might suggest that when estimating the 
prevalence of such values in a population we consider the available population cues more 
carefully, an indication that cognitive heuristic explanations might be more appropriate 
(Mullen et al., 1984). However, Marks and Miller‟s meta-study (1987) indicated that the 
motivational explanation of the false consensus effect is more appropriate in evaluations of 
unfamiliar situations and objects. When the respondents evaluated traits in performances that 
they were very familiar with, and when they considered themselves to be part of the group in 
which they were to evaluate the prevalence of a trait, the cognitive factors affecting the false 
consensus effect provided a more suitable explanation. The fact that the motivational 
explanations for the false consensus effect are more suitable when evaluating a person 
belonging to an out-group or an unfamiliar trait or action might at first seem counter intuitive. 
One might assume that the motivation to feel similar to the stimulus person would be stronger 
if one considered the stimulus person to belong to one‟s own group. These results might be 
explained by that when evaluating an in-group member on familiar traits, one is to a larger 
degree exposed to a selective sample and the personal anchor is stronger.  
 According to prior research on the false consensus effect, an evaluation of a stimulus 
person‟s rationality should be affected by the rationality of the respondent. Such a preference 
for rational decision making strategies in the respondents can be described as cognitive style. 
 
Cognitive style 
 Cognitive style is a theoretical concept that refers to a manner of thinking, and a 
preferred way of organising and processing information (Messick, 1976). It has been 
conceptualized both as a trait, and as personal preferences among steps and other aspects of 
mental functioning (Guilford, 1980). According to Riding and Cheema (1991), cognitive style 
is an attribute that is something in between an aptitude and a personality trait. In most 
definitions cognitive style involves both the gathering and processing of information 
(Blaylock & Rees, 1984).  
 Cognitive styles are not to be confused with ability. Cognitive abilities describe how 
well a task is performed, while cognitive style explains in which manner the task is carried 
out (Guilford, 1980). The concept of cognitive abilities is value directional. The higher 
abilities, the better. In the case of cognitive style, this is more a matter of different preference 
on information gathering and processing. One cognitive style cannot be said to be 
qualitatively better than another (Messic, 1984). It is more a question of the manner of 
performance than the level of performance (Messic, 1976).  
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 Cognitive style affects the way people make decisions. People with a stable preference 
for intuitive decision making are faster decision makers and rely more on implicit knowledge 
(Chodorow, 1974; Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). Analytical decision makers make more 
normative correct decisions than intuitive decision makers (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This 
implies the idea of task-style fit. One cognitive style might in some cases be better suited to 
certain tasks and decisions, while another style might be more suitable and appropriate for 
other people or in other situations. Two very different cognitive styles can also, in some cases, 
lead to the same results (Betsch & Kunz, 2008). There has been some debate as to whether the 
concept is unidimensional or contains several dimensions. There are therefore several 
different theoretical and operational definitions of the term, and some confusion and 
controversy in the area. The next section will therefore describe different theories on the 
content of the construct cognitive style, focusing on dimensions that all the theories have in 
common.  
 In one of the earliest scientific conceptualisations of cognitive style Jung (1970) 
suggested that there were differences in the ways in which we both percept and judge the 
world around us. According to Jung‟s definition of cognitive style, people percept the world 
by either sensing or using our intuition. They then make judgements based on their 
perceptions by either thinking or feeling. Other earlier theories have conceptualized cognitive 
style as a preference for field dependence or field independence. Field independence is 
described as the ability to and preference for distinguishing objects from their surroundings. 
People who are low in field independence operate with broad, composite concepts, and do not 
focus on the details of each sub-concept. Their thinking and cognitive functioning is more 
holistic and global. People who are high in field independence analyze all information 
separately and detailed, and are less focused on the big picture (Witkin, 1965, 1976). Another 
way of conceptualizing cognitive style has been complexity versus simplicity, a tendency to 
or a preference for sorting information into fewer or more separate categories (Guilford, 1980; 
Kelly, 1955). Other theories focus on the degree to which the attention is captured and held by 
specific points, focusing versus scanning (Woodrow, 1939), or a preference for differential or 
diffuse use of information (Wachtel, 1968).  
 What these theories have in common is a focus on the preference for holistically and 
globally scanning the situation to get an intuitive overview and make top-down evaluations, 
or for analyzing each aspect of the situation in detail in order to make bottom-up evaluations 
(Van den Broeck et al, 2003). Today cognitive style is often understood as a unidimensional, 
bipolar concept. Some researchers claim to have identified as many as 29 separate cognitive 
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styles. Factor analyses suggest more than one dimension, but as the number of dimensions 
increases, so does the difficulty of valid and reliable measurement (Allinson & Hayes, 1996). 
 Cognitive style has been found to be a useful concept in many aspects of the work 
place. It appears to act as a moderating variable in explaining work performance (Kirton & 
McCarthy, 1988). Similarity or differences in cognitive style affect interaction between 
colleagues, and knowledge about the cognitive style of colleagues increases understanding 
and tolerance in the work place (Talbot, 1989). Hayes and Allinson (1994) have suggested the 
concept‟s usefulness in areas such as selection, performance, placement, leadership and 
teamwork. When people chose jobs that provided good fit with their cognitive style, they 
found the job more rewarding (Streufert & Nogami, 1989), and colleagues that have 
knowledge of each other‟s cognitive styles appear to work better together and respect each 
other‟s differences (Edgley, 1992). Women are stereotypically viewed as more emotional and 
less analytical than men (Taynor & Deaux, 1975). However, tests of cognitive style suggest 
that this is not the case. Studies have in most cases produced significant results indicating that 
the style of cognitive women is more rational than that of men (Allinson & Hayes, 1996).  
 As argued above, the false consensus effect leads respondents to assume that their own 
traits and preferences are more common in a population than alternative preferences. 
Respondents also assume that a stimulus person will be, act and think similarly to them. In the 
present study, I therefore hypothesised that the respondents would assume that the cognitive 
style of the respondent would be similar to their own. My third hypothesis is therefore as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The cognitive style of the respondent affects the evaluation of the perceived 
 rationality of the stimulus person. Respondents with an analytical cognitive style
 perceive the stimulus person as more rational. 
 
 To my knowledge, no research has yet investigated if there are gender differences in 
the false consensus effect. The selectivity model however suggests that men and women 
select different cues and pieces of information from their surroundings when making a 
judgement or an evaluation. The theory implies that men are in general more likely to look at 
the overall message, while women are more prone to elaborate detailed when evaluating a 
situation or message (Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991; Meyers-Levy 
& Sternthal, 1991). The selectivity model states that these differences have both biological 
and social explanations. Studies have suggested that differences in sex chromosomes, sex 
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hormones and brain lateralization may account for some of these differences. Such possible 
biological differences are further strengthened as men and women are treated different by 
society. Careful consideration is encouraged in women more than in men, in line with 
stereotypical views on gender differences (Putrevu, 2001). The selectivity model is supported 
by several studies that have showed that men are more prone than women to make use of 
heuristics in their evaluations (Benyamini et al., 2000; Gilligan, 1982; Lenney et al., 1983; 
Poole, 1977). My fourth and last hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between cognitive style of the respondent and the evaluation 
 of the perceived rationality of the stimulus person is moderated by the gender of  the 
 respondent. The false consensus effect is stronger for the men in the sample. 
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Method 
Organizational context 
 The data was collected among the employees at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 
The Ministry of Defence is a Government Office whose main responsibilities consist of the 
formation and implementation of Norwegian security and defence policy. The employees at 
the Ministry of Defence are both women and men, from both military and civilian 
professional backgrounds and different levels of leadership. The questionnaire was sent out to 
all the employees at the Ministry. The Ministry of Defence supported this research project and 
were helpful in the acquisition of a research sample, as a part of a greater effort to review 
practices involving the role of gender within different areas of their domain and activities. 
The Ministry of Defence is a good environment for a study concerning gender biases and 
cognitive style. Due to its close connection to the Norwegian Armed Forces it has 
traditionally been a male dominated work place. Rationality is often viewed as a masculine 
trait (Taynor & Deaux, 1975) and is highly valued within the Norwegian Armed Forces. A 
military background is often intuitively associated with a rational cognitive style and pro-male 
bias. The professional background of the subjects has therefore been included as a control 
variable in the present study. 
 
Sample 
 The sample consisted of 186 respondents, 121 men and 65 women. The questionnaire 
was sent to all 314 employees at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, at all levels of 
management and with both civilian and military background, yielding a response rate of 
59 %. Out of the total 186 respondents, 112 reported having a primarily non-military 
background (60.2 %), 58 of these were men and 54 women. Seventy-four respondents 
reported a primarily military background (39.8 %), 63 of these were men and 11 women (see 
table 1). 
 
Procedure  
 An online questionnaire was sent to 314 employees at the Ministry of Defence. All the 
respondents answered the complete 38 item version of the Cognitive Style Index (Allinson 
and Hayes, 1996) and provided their gender and their professional background. The 
respondents were also presented with a scenario, describing a dilemma at the workplace. They 
were asked to evaluate the rationality of the course of action chosen by the stimulus person in 
the scenario. Details of the construction of this scenario are presented further down in this 
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section. Half of the respondents were introduced to the scenario with a male decision maker 
(version A). The other half was presented with version B of the fictive decision, with a female 
decision maker. The fictive decision versions A and B were identical, except for the gender of 
the decision maker. Ninety-four responded to version A of the questionnaire, with a male 
decision maker, 64 of these men and 30 of them women. Ninety-two responded to version B 
of the questionnaire with a female decision maker, 57 of these men and 35 of them women.  
 
Measures  
 Cognitive Style. Many tests of cognitive style concentrate on the dimension field 
dependency versus field independency, in line with the analytic versus holistic approach (e.g. 
Oltman, 1968; Witkin et. al., 1962; Witkin et al., 1971). These tests are, however, 
cumbersome and time consuming to administer, and require great skill in administration and 
interpretation (Halpern, 2000). It has been argued that some of these tests measure cognitive 
ability, rather than cognitive style (Schweiger, 1983).  
 For the purpose of this study, I chose to measure cognitive style as a measure of 
analytical rationality versus emotional intuition, measured on the Cognitive Style Index (CSI) 
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996). The CSI measures a bipolar, unidimensional construct of 
analytical versus intuitive cognitive style. This construct is in line with previous theoretical 
understanding of the concept cognitive style (e.g. Van den Broeck et al, 2003) The CSI is a 
rather new measurement, but it shows promising validity and reliability. It consists of 38 
items, asking the respondents to rate to which extent they agree or disagree with statements 
about their decision making preferences. The following is an example item from the CSI-
scale: “I am inclined to scan through reports rather than read them in detail”. The response 
format is trichotome (agree, don‟t agree, don‟t know). For statements describing a preference 
for an analytical cognitive style, the option „agree‟ was scored 2 and „don‟t agree‟ was scored 
0. For statements describing a preference for an intuitive cognitive style, the option „agree‟ 
was scored 0 and „don‟t agree‟ was scored 2. The option „don‟t know‟ was always scored 1. 
The results are given on a scale from 0 (very intuitive) to 76 (very analytical). The responses 
on the CSI-scale in my study yielded a Cronbach‟s alpha of .82. The items were translated to 
Norwegian for the purpose of this study by means of a translation – back translation process. 
 
 Evaluation of stimulus scenario. The respondents were presented with a scenario 
(see appendix A) that described a fictive decision maker in a dilemma at work, and his/her 
reaction to the dilemma. I wrote this scenario based on similar scenarios presented in earlier 
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research on the pro-male evaluation bias. An especially helpful example was the scenario 
used in the study by Taynor and Deaux  (1975), where the female stimulus person was 
evaluated by the respondents as acting less rationally than the corresponding male stimulus 
person. I took care to make the situation described and the reactions of the stimulus person as 
ambiguous as possible, as this is a necessity for producing a pro-male bias (e.g. Deaux & 
Emswiller, 1974). I also intentionally wrote the scenario to take place in an area of work that 
would not be immediately related to the everyday work life of my respondents, thus 
minimising the possibility that prior knowledge of similar situations would affect the 
evaluation. Apart from this, however, I did not include any of the other moderating variables 
that have been shown to increase the pro-male bias. The profession of the stimulus person or 
the situation was chosen as not to invoke sex role stereotypes (Gutek & Stevens, 1977). The 
respondents were asked to evaluate a clearly fictive performance (Ross et al., 1976) that had 
already taken place. They were in other words not asked to evaluate future potential and 
qualifications, or make casual attributions (Nieva & Gutek, 1980). If the scenario had been 
written to include the circumstances mentioned above, the chances of the study to produce a 
significant pro-male bias would have been higher. I intentionally chose not to include these 
moderating variables in the stimulus scenario used in the present study, as I wanted to isolate 
the pro-male bias in the most basic form, uninfluenced by moderating variables. 
 Respondents were asked to rate the perceived rationality of the fictive decision on a 7-
point Likert scale of 5 items specially created for this study, where 1 indicated „very little‟ 
and 7 indicated „very much‟. The scoring of the scale resulted in a score between 5 (very 
intuitive) and 35 (very analytical). The items from the stimulus scenario were based on the 
core constructs measured by the CSI, and worded in a similar way as the CSI-items. It was 
important that the formulation of the items in the scenario was similar to that of the items in 
the CSI. This was the only way to ensure that a significant relationship between the two 
measures could be called a false consensus effect, as the false consensus effect describes a 
tendency in the respondents to assume that others will be similar to themselves on the same 
trait (Ross et al., 1976). The fact that the two measures were similar did not represent a 
problem, as the CSI measured the respondents own cognitive style, whereas the items in the 
stimulus scenario measured how the respondents perceived the cognitive style of the stimulus 
person (see appendix A). The scale that was used in this study to rate the rationality/ 
emotionality of the fictive decision originally contained 6 items. Item 6 was removed before 
the analyses in order to improve reliability, because of a negative correlation with the other 
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items of the scale. The removed item concerned the tendency to follow ones gut feeling in the 
decision making process. The final 5 item scale had a Cronbach‟s alpha of .84. 
 Gender. The gender of the respondent was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. 
 The gender of the fictive decision maker. The gender of the fictive decision maker 
was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. 
 Professional background. Professional background was coded as 0 for primarily 
military and 1 for primarily civilian. 
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Results 
 Means, standard deviations and correlations of all variables are shown in Table 1. 
Results from both scales used in the study proved to possess a satisfying reliability (Table 1).  
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4  
1. Scenario evaluation 21.25 6.87 (.84)     
2. CSI 42.73 11.23 .16* (.82)    
3. Gender in scenario (0=male, 1=female) .51 .50 -.07 .08    
4. Gender respondent (0=male, 1=female) .35 .48 -.24*** .07 .06   
5. Professional background (0=military, 
1=civilian) 
.60 .49 .09 -.11 .03 .34***  
Note. Cronbach‟s alphas in brackets on the diagonal. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
 
 Before performing the analyses to test my hypotheses the distribution of responses on 
each scale was considered, and this was found to be approximate to normal distribution. There 
were no missing values in the dataset. A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to 
investigate whether the gender of the fictive decision maker in the scenario and the CSI of the 
respondents affect the evaluation of the rationality of the stimulus person. I also examined 
whether any of these two relationships were moderated by the gender of the respondent. The 
professional background of the respondents was used as a control variable. I tested for 
multicollinearity, and this was not found to be a problem in this dataset. The results of the 
hierarchical regression analysis can be viewed in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Evaluation of Scenario 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
     
Control variable     
Professional background -.09 -.03 -.05 -.05 
Main effects     
CSI  .19** .04 .04 
Gender in scenario  -.07 -.07 -.04 
Gender of respondent  -.24** -.24** -.20* 
Interaction terms     
Gender of respondent x CSI   .24** .24** 
Gender of respondent x Gender in scenario 
 
   -.05 
F 1.57 4.73** 5.28*** 4.41*** 
R2  .09** .03** .00 
R
2 
.01 .10 .13 .13 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. CSI= Cognitive Style Index  
 
 The control variable professional background was not significantly related to the 
dependent variable.  
 Hypothesis 1 suggested that there would be a pro-male bias in the evaluations of the 
stimulus scenario, that a male stimulus person would be evaluated as being more rational than 
a female stimulus person. As seen in Table 2, the hierarchical linear regression reveals that 
there was no significant relationship between the gender of the fictive stimulus person and the 
judgement of the stimulus decision. The data did not support the existence of a pro-male bias, 
and so Hypothesis 1 was not supported in the present dataset. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted a false consensus effect, suggesting that the CSI-score of the 
respondent would significantly affect the evaluation of the stimulus scenario. The CSI-score 
of the respondent significantly contributed to the variation in the judgements of the fictive 
decision. The variables were positively related, as rational respondents evaluated the stimulus 
person to be more rational, and respondents with an intuitive cognitive style evaluated the 
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stimulus person to be more emotional. The analysis supported Hypothesis 3, as there seems to 
be an overall false consensus effect.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the strength of the pro-male bias would be moderated by the 
gender of the respondent. There was no evidence in the dataset that the gender of the 
respondent had a moderating effect on the non-significant relationship between the gender of 
the fictive decision maker and the evaluation of this fictive decision maker‟s rationality. 
Hence, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that the strength of the false consensus effect would be 
moderated by the gender of the respondent. The moderator variable gender of respondents had 
a significant moderating effect on the relationship between cognitive style and the judgement 
of the stimulus person. Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported (Table 2).  
 
Figure 2 
The moderating effect of the gender of the respondent on the relationship between SCI-scores 
and scenario evaluation. 
 
 The significant moderation effect on the relationship between the CSI-score of the 
respondent and the judgement of the fictive decision maker‟s decision is visualised in Figure 
2. Figure 2 is generated using an online ModGraph generator (Jose, 2008). This moderation 
Intuitive Analytical 
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effect means that the gender of the respondent affected the strength of the relationship 
between the CSI-score of the respondent and the evaluation of the stimulus person. This 
relationship was significantly stronger for the women in the sample than for the men. A 
simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that the false consensus effect was 
significant only for the women in the sample (simple slope = .26, t =  3.6, p < .001) and a 
nonsignificant slope for males (simple slope = .03, t = .47, n.s.). Men‟s evaluation of the 
stimulus person was not affected by the respondents own CSI-score. Female respondents who 
scored highly on the CSI-scale, however, tended to perceive the fictive decision maker as 
more rational than the women with CSI-scores towards the more intuitive end of the scale. 
This shows that Hypothesis 4 was only partly supported. The gender of the respondent 
moderated the relationship between the CSI-score of the respondent and the evaluation of the 
stimulus scenario, but in the opposite direction than anticipated. 
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Discussion  
 The purpose of this study was to investigate how the internally triggered false 
consensus bias and the externally based pro-male bias affect the evaluation of a stimulus 
person. I initiated this study with the idea that the two biases explained different parts of the 
variation, and would yield significant separate contributions to the variance in the evaluations 
of the stimulus scenario. Both of these effects have been documented before, but the research 
on the pro-male bias is possibly outdated, and there is little research on evaluations of 
perceived rationality in an occupational setting.  
 The moderation effect of gender on the pro-male bias is well documented, and was 
therefore included in the present study. Very little research has investigated the moderating 
effect on gender on biases like the false consensus effect. Research supporting the selectivity 
model (Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991; Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 
1991) justified the inclusion of gender as a moderating variable in the hypothesis concerning 
the false consensus effect as well. I therefore hypothesised that there would be a pro-male bias 
and a false consensus effect in the evaluation of the stimulus person, and that both biases 
would be stronger for men.  
 The present study found no evidence for such a pro-male bias, neither for the female 
nor male respondents. The other two hypotheses predicted that the false consensus effect 
would lead respondents to judge the stimulus person to have a similar cognitive style to 
themselves, and that this false consensus effect would be stronger for men. A significant false 
consensus effect was found for the women in the sample only. As no evidence for a pro male 
bias was found, it was not possible to investigate the individual contributions of the two 
biases together. At a general level the most important findings in the present study is the 
absence of a pro-male bias in the data, and the finding that the false consensus effect was 
significant only for the female respondents. Gender was indeed a significant moderator in this 
relationship, but in the opposite direction than hypothesised. 
 
Pro-male bias 
 No pro-male bias was found in the present study, although this is an effect that has 
been consistently documented in earlier research (e.g. Goldberg, 1968). The main bulk of the 
research on the pro-male evaluation bias was done before the 90‟s. The results in the present 
study may reflect an actual decrease in pro male bias, as a result of a decrease in gender 
stereotyping since the previous research was conducted. The Ministry of Defence as a work 
place has a strong focus on equal rights of women, and this may have further contributed to 
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the decrease in pro-male evaluation bias. If the pro-male evaluation bias is indeed weaker than 
when the previous research in the area was conducted, this is a very important finding. These 
results indicate that women‟s conditions in all aspects of the work place have improved, and 
that they are more fairly evaluated today than they were in earlier decades. However, the fact 
that I did not find support for a pro-male bias in this study might also be a result of the 
stimulus scenario being worded to exclude most of the variables that usually increase the 
strength of the pro-male bias. The pro-male bias in evaluation tends to be stronger when the 
respondent is asked to evaluate a stimulus person performing at a high level (Deaux & 
Taynor, 1973). Although the scenario used in this study depicts a demanding decision, the 
fictive decision maker‟s performance cannot be called very high. Stereotypes also tend to 
increase in strength when the task being performed is a highly gendered task (Holter, 1971; 
Levinson, 1975). In this scenario I chose a gender neutral task, and this may have contributed 
to lower levels of prejudice.  The scenario used in this study required a judgement of past 
behaviour, rather than a prediction of future performance, as would be the case in a selection 
decision. This may have further decreased the strength of the gender stereotype effect (Nieva 
& Gutek, 1980). In sum, I designed the scenario to exclude as many of the known moderating 
variables as possible, in order to isolate the effect of the decision maker‟s gender. A possible 
explanation for the absence of a pro-male bias in my study is that these moderating variables 
act as confounding variables, artificially enlarging the effect of the gender of the fictive 
decision maker. The fact that this study could not identify any significant results to support a 
pro-male evaluation bias is therefore not necessarily the result of an actual decrease in gender 
biases in evaluation, but is perhaps due to methodological issues caused by the wording of the 
stimulus scenario. 
 The most obvious interpretation of my results on the pro-male bias is still that this bias 
simply did not exist in the sample. Such a finding is an important contribution to the 
developing research on the pro-male bias, as this indicates that which biases we are prone to 
is not just innate, but is also affected by socialisation and the values of society. If the strength 
of the influence of biases can change in a population over time, such biases have to be in part 
the result of environmental factors, and not just a matter of genetically determined 
predispositions. This is an important point, as biases are often explained as being adaptive 
(e.g. Gigerenze & Todd, 1999), a term that implies explanations of evolution and natural 
selection. If the pro-male bias has decreased over time, this serves as an important reminder 
that some biases are not simply a result of hardwired cognitive patterns people are born with, 
but also a result of acquired knowledge and learning. 
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The false consensus effect 
 Perhaps the most surprising finding in the present study was that the women displayed 
a stronger false consensus effect than the men in the sample. This result contradicts the 
preponderance of findings in relation to the selectivity model (Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-
Levy & Maheswaran, 1991; Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1991). My results are therefore 
somewhat controversial and require additional explanation. Some light might however be 
shed on the matter by the distinction between the two different explanations for the false 
consensus effect. Most of the studies that show higher use of heuristics for men than women 
include stimulus situations and messages that are highly familiar to the respondents (Graham, 
Stendardi, Myers & Graham, 2002; Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991; 
Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1991). This gender difference in the use of heuristic thinking has 
been shown to be stronger when the respondents are evaluating a stimulus person who is very 
similar to themselves (Graham, 1994). In such stimulus situations the cognitive explanations 
for the false consensus bias would be more appropriate than the motivational explanation 
(Marks & Miller, 1987).  
The stimulus situation in the present study was unfamiliar to the respondents, and the stimulus 
person did not belong to the respondents‟ immediate in-group. This would suggest that the 
motivational explanation for the false consensus effect would be more important in this study 
than the heuristic factors (Dunning et al., 1989; Marks & Miller, 1987). Any false consensus 
effect in the present study might therefore be motivated by a need or wish to be similar to 
others, to feel normal, and to fit into a group.  
 This need is stronger in females than in males. Women are more likely than men to 
prioritise close, intimate relationships (Miller, 1986), and are more attuned to the relationships 
of others (Watkins et al., 1998, 2003). Women report experiencing more empathy than men 
and to some extent show more empathy when tested in experiments (Batson et al., 1996; Hunt 
et al., 1990).  Women have larger social networks (Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987) and report 
receiving more social support than men (Burda, Vaux & Schill, 1984; Butler, Giordano & 
Neren, 1985; Leavy, 1983). Seeing oneself in relation to others, communion has been viewed 
as a feminine trait (Chodorow, 1974) and studies have shown that women define themselves 
in relation to others more often (Gilligan, 1982).  
 A meta-analysis on gender differences has shown that women are more concerned 
about relationships. Women also acted in ways that would support relationships and that 
increased the possibility that they would be approved by others (Barnett & Karson, 1989). 
The research cited above did not explore whether these tendencies are innate characteristics or 
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skills learned through social expectations. This is not important in the present study; it will 
suffice to establish that research suggests that group belonging and fitting in is more 
important to women than men (Miller, 1986). As the design of the present study likely 
invoked the motivational grounds for the false consensus bias, these gender differences in 
need for group belonging might offer a partial explanation for the reverse gender moderation 
effect on the false consensus effect. 
 The results in the present study are far from fully explained by the motivational 
explanations of the false consensus effect and gender differences in need for group belonging. 
I regard my results merely as an indication that there are aspects of the role of gender in the 
false consensus effect that are not fully understood. Considering the findings from the Marks 
and Miller meta-study (1987) on the different explanations for the false consensus effect, the 
difference in motivational and cognitive explanations might play a role in these gender 
differences.  
 
Limitations and implications for future research 
 Although my study has produced important findings, I acknowledge several 
limitations to it. One such limitation is that it is impossible to determine the cause for the 
absence of a pro-male bias. This finding may be due to an actual lower level of stereotypes in 
the present sample. It may also be a result of the way the stimulus scenario was designed. As 
mentioned, I designed my stimulus scenario so that it contained few of the variables that 
usually increase the pro-male bias. The situation should not have invoked sex role stereotypes 
(Gutek & Stevens, 1977) and respondents were not asked to evaluate future potential and 
qualifications, or make casual attributions (Nieva & Gutek, 1980). The stimulus person 
cannot be called a high performer, as the performance of the stimulus person cannot be said to 
be especially good or indisputably correct (Deaux & Taynor, 1973). If these moderating 
variables had been included in the scenario, it might have resulted in a significant pro-male 
bias effect in the sample. As mentioned, these variables were intentionally excluded from the 
stimulus scenario in my study, in order to isolate the most basic form of the pro-male bias 
effect. Although this served a purpose in the study, it made it difficult to ascertain whether the 
absence of a pro-male bias in the present study is due to an actual decrease in stereotypes or 
merely the elimination of moderating variables.  
 I therefore suggest that further research in this area considers different degrees of the 
presence of moderating variables. It would be of interest to further investigate the independent 
contribution of the moderating variables in the pro-male bias mentioned above. Each of the 
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variables known to moderate the strength of the pro-male evaluation bias has been 
individually documented.  It would be useful to include several of these moderators in a 
study, to evaluate the independent effect of each one. It would also be of interest to 
investigate whether this lack of pro-male evaluation bias would hold true in other work places 
as well. The Ministry of Defence is an unconventional work place, and has traditionally been 
dominated by male and rational values. Further replications of this kind of study would help 
to determine whether the decrease in pro-male bias in comparison to other studies is due to 
special circumstances in this particular study or an actual decrease in gender prejudice over 
time.  
 Another limitation is this study‟s inability to fully account for the surprising finding of 
a significant false consensus effect for the women in the sample only, and not for the men. 
This moderation effect was in the opposite direction as hypothesised. Although the 
motivational explanation of the false consensus effect (Dunning et al., 1989; Marks & Miller, 
1987) and gender differences in need for group belonging (Miller, 1986) may provide 
hypotheses for further research, this explanation is far from conclusive. Future research into 
the false consensus effect should include gender as a moderating variable, and should aim at 
systematically examining if this moderating effect varies with the nature of the stimulus 
scenario. If the tendency for women in the present study to display a stronger false consensus 
effect is indeed due to an invokement of motivational reasons that are stronger in women, this 
gender difference should not exist in non-western cultures. Gender differences in need for 
group belonging and the tendency to define oneself by social relationships is a purely western 
finding (Watkins et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 2003). Cross cultural studies in gender as a 
moderator of the false consensus effect could give new insight into the role of the 
motivational explanations for this bias. 
 In the present study the respondents were asked to simply evaluate a clearly fictive 
performance made by a stimulus person. This may be a limitation to the study. The false 
consensus effect has been showed to be stronger when the respondents are either asked to 
make a choice or perform a task themselves, or when watching what they believe to be an 
actual person perform a task (Ross et al., 1976). Neither was the case in the present study. 
Any design that would allow the respondents to perform tasks or watch an actual stimulus 
person make such a performance would have been far too ambitious for a project of such 
limited scope. The solution I chose was the most pragmatic choice within the external frames 
of a master thesis project. Future research might investigate whether other results are found 
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when the respondents are asked to make choices and actions themselves, as opposed to simply 
evaluating a fictive stimulus scenario. 
 My study, as many other studies within this research tradition, only investigated the 
processing of information. All the background information was already presented to the 
respondents in the stimulus scenario. This may be a limitation to the study, as heuristics like 
the pro-male bias and the false consensus effect concern both the acquisition and processing 
of information (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). More ambitious studies with a more flexible scope 
might want to investigate the false consensus effect in designs that would allow the 
respondents to select themselves which information to gather before processing the gathered 
information.  
 Some might argue that I should have taken into account the possible presence of a 
better-than-average effect in the study. When evaluating others, respondents tend to judge 
their own performance as better than average. This in turn leads to the respondents evaluating 
the stimulus person somewhat lower on positive traits than on neutral traits. This tendency is 
called the better-than-average effect, and is a self-preservation bias that contributes to 
maintaining our self-esteem. This better-than-average effect might lead to an underestimate of 
the positive traits of others (Alicke, 1985; Dunning et al., 1989). If the scenario in my study 
had asked the participants to evaluate the quality of the performance, this effect may have led 
to artificially low estimates. A discussion of the better-than-average should have been 
included in the study if the traits evaluated in the stimulus scenario were value directional, 
that is if one score was considered better than another. If the trait to be evaluated had been 
value directional, the better-than-average effect might have led the evaluation scores on the 
stimulus scenario to regress somewhat towards the mean. Theoretically cognitive style is not 
value directional (Messic, 1984). The wording of the questions in the stimulus scenario was 
not expressively focused on an evaluation of quality. I therefore did not expect there to be a 
better-than-average effect in this study, and chose to exclude this theoretical aspect from the 
research design and the general discussion. 
 
Implications for practice 
 Even though there was no evidence for a pro-male bias in the present study, such a 
bias may still exist in other situations and work places. The present study has practical 
implications for selection personnel, as biases may be particularly strong in selection 
situations. In selection situations one attempts to evaluate how well the candidates will be 
able to perform in the position in the future if hired. People exhibit a stronger pro-male 
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evaluation bias and a greater degree of heuristic thinking in situations where the stimulus 
situation to be evaluated is future potential and qualifications, and when making causal 
attributions (Nieva & Gutek, 1980). Pro-male bias and heuristic thinking also appears to 
increase in judgements based on ambiguous and diffuse performance criteria (Deaux & 
Emswiller, 1974; Rosen & Jerdee, 1974; Terborg & Ilgen, 1975). The false consensus effect 
is also stronger in cases when evaluating ambiguous traits that can describe a number of 
behaviours (Dunning et al., 1989). Biases are therefore likely to occur in evaluations in 
selection processes. 
 The pro-male bias is likely to present stronger in selection situations recruiting for 
higher managerial positions. The pro male bias is stronger when evaluating candidates for 
typically male positions (Levinson, 1974), and when the position is one that requires high 
performance (Rosen & Jerdee, 1974) and aggressive, stereotypically male behaviour 
(Haefner, 1977). An example of such a situation where a pro-male bias and the false 
consensus effect are likely to occur would then be when evaluating candidates for a 
managerial position. In such selection situations one has to evaluate candidates‟ future 
potential on often vaguely defined traits and abilities. This will, to some extent, also be the 
case in many promotion decisions, with the implication that pro-male biases are more potent 
in such instances.  
 This is a point that has implications for practice in selection and promotion purposes. 
In many cases the people making hiring and promotional decisions are human resources 
specialists, who are only familiar with their own professional fields and their selection 
methods. Such selection personnel often lack a thorough understanding of the professional 
fields relevant for the position they are selecting for. Consequently, if the people making 
decisions in selection processes are not familiar with the particular content of the position to 
be filled, this may lead them to have only a diffuse idea of the performance criteria. In such 
cases their evaluations would be prone to heuristic thinking that may lead to unfair 
disadvantages for certain groups of applicants. Practical implications would be to make sure a 
proper job profile is made, describing the exact content of the position to be filled. Such a 
profile should be made in cooperation with previous employees in the position in question, 
and in conference with other job experts. The criteria that the candidates are evaluated against 
should be as objective and explicit as possible. Such efforts would decrease the degree to 
which cognitive biases affect the selection and promotion evaluations and decisions. 
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Conclusion  
 In the present study, the male and the female stimulus person were evaluated as 
equally rational. This result has important implications for the conditions of women in the 
work place, as it indicates that these conditions have bettered since the main bulk of the 
research on the false consensus effect was conducted, before the 1990‟s. Such a result also 
has implications for the explanations for and origins of biases and heuristics. If the strength of 
biases can change over time, such biases must in effect be partly the result of environmental 
influences and not just innate genetics. In the present study I found a significant false 
consensus effect for the women in the sample only. This finding is in contrast to earlier 
research, but may in part be explained by the motivational explanations of the false consensus 
effect and gender differences in need for group belonging.  
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Appendix A, stimulus scenario 
Bente Hansen er 42 år gammel. Hun har to barn og bor sammen med sin mann og barna i et 
boligområde utenfor en middels stor by i Norge. Bente er lærer på videregående skole. Skolen 
har over lengre tid kjørt holdningskampanjer for å få bukt med problemer skolen har hatt med 
elever som jukser. Klassen til Bente skal ha prøve i spansk denne dagen. Dette er en viktig 
prøve i forhold til karaktergivning i faget. En av Bentes pliktoppfyllende elever har lenge slitt 
med søvnproblemer, konsentrasjonsvansker og dårlig matlyst på grunn av et dramatisk 
dødsfall i nær familie ganske nylig. Eleven kommer av denne grunn uforberedt til prøven og 
er fortvilet og lei seg.  Fordi prøven er så viktig for elevens karakter i faget, har eleven funnet 
ut at en jukselapp er eneste utvei akkurat denne gangen. Midtveis i prøven oppdager Bente at 
eleven jukser. Bente vet at dette er en elev som vanligvis er pliktoppfyllende og 
samvittighetsfull. Bente kjenner at hun blir både overrasket og skuffet over eleven.  Bente 
finner det riktig å ta eleven ut av timen og gi en kraftig irettesettelse. Bente velger i tillegg å 
sende eleven til rektors kontor for å markere alvoret i situasjonen og skolens offisielle 
holdning i forhold til slike forseelser. 
 
1. Hvor rasjonelt synes du Bente taklet denne situasjonen? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
2. I hvor stor grad synes du Bente lot seg styre av følelser i denne situasjonen? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
3. I hvor stor grad tror du Bente tenkte logisk gjennom denne situasjonen? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
4. Hvor emosjonell synes du Bente var i denne situasjonen? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
5. I hvor stor grad fikk du inntrykk av at Bente tenkte gjennom alle delene av situasjonen 
før hun handlet? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
6. Hvor mye tror du Bente stolte på magefølelsen sin i denne situasjonen? 
Veldig lite  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Veldig mye 
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Appendix A, stimulus scenario (English version) 
Bente Hansen is 42 years old. She has two children and lives with her husband and the 
children in a residential area outside a Norwegian city of medium size. Bente is a teacher at an 
upper secondary school. The school has over a longer period held a campaign combating the 
problems the school has been experiencing with students cheating at tests. Today Bente‟s 
class is having a Spanish test. This is an important test for the final grade in the subject. One 
of Bente‟s conscientious students has been suffering from problems with sleep and 
concentration and lack of appetite for some time now, caused by a relatively recent death in 
the closest family. The student shows up for the test unprepared, and is distraught and upset. 
As the test is so important for the final grade, the student has decided that bringing a cheat 
sheet is the only resort on this particular day. In the middle of the test Bente discovers that the 
student is cheating. Bente knows that this is a student who is usually very conscientious. 
Bente feels very disappointed and surprised. Bente finds it appropriate to remove the student 
from the test, and administer a strong reprimand. Bente also chooses to send the student down 
to the head master, in order to emphasise the seriousness of the situation. 
 
1. How rationally do you feel Bente handled the situation? 
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
2. To what degree do you feel Bente was lead by emotions in this situation? 
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
3. To what degree do you think Bente thought logically through the situation?  
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
4. How emotionally do you feel Bente acted in this situation? 
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
5. To what degree do you perceive that Bente thought through all the components of the 
situation before making a decision? 
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
6. How much do you feel Bente trusted her gut feeling in this situation? 
Very much  1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very little 
 
